Research

Working Papers

 
Informative Milestones in Experimentation
I study a continuous-time moral hazard problem with private learning about a project of unknown quality. There is ex ante symmetric information and full commitment for the principal. The project generates a profit if two consecutive stages are completed. The amount of experimentation required to complete the first stage (milestone) is informative but not conclusive about the quality of the project. The informativeness of the milestone yields an incentive to privately shirk in the first stage. Shirking increases the principal’s pessimism in the second stage and
thereby induces more favorable second-stage contract terms for the agent. In the optimal contract, the reward for a first-stage success decreases in its arrival time to prevent effort delays. The reward’s composition changes with the success time: early successes are rewarded with long second-stage deadlines and no bonus payments in the first stage, while later successes are rewarded with first-stage bonus payments and less continuation value from second-stage experimentation. Allowing for agent replacement between stages, I show that the principal wants to replace the agent in the second stage if the success arrives late.


Bidder Asymmetries in Procurement Auctions: Efficiency vs. Information
(joint with
Stefan Weiergraeber)
We develop a structural empirical model of procurement auctions with private and common value components and asymmetric bidders in both dimensions. While each asymmetry can explain the dominance of a firm, they have opposite welfare implications. We propose a novel empirical strategy to disentangle and to quantify the two asymmetries using detailed contract-level data on the German market for railway passenger services. Our results indicate that the incumbent is slightly more cost-efficient and has substantially more information about future ticket revenues than its competitors. If bidders’ common value asymmetry was eliminated, the average probability of selecting the efficient firm would increase by 40%-points.

Work in Progress

Consumer Rating Dynamics
(joint with André Stenzel)
We consider dynamic price-setting by firms in the presence of rating systems and asymmetric information about product quality. The price a firm charges determines the characteristics of purchasing consumers and thereby affects future ratings and continuation profits. We outline the effects of prices on consumers’ inference as well as their review upon purchase. We provide a characterization of the firm’s pricing decision in the presence of consumers who conduct inference based on an observable aggregate rating and current price: Inference is characterized by a pair of inferred quality and purchasing consumers’ tastes such that the aggregate rating is consistent and purchase decisions are individually rational. Sufficient conditions such that this inference is uniquely determined are obtained and the impact on the incentives of a strategic firm are outlined. We show that the strategic incentives may lead to the firm over- or undercharging relative to the myopically optimal price, depending on fundamentals. Moreover, we provide evidence in form of a numerical implementation which suggests that rating systems with limited memory, as recently suggested by e.g. Amazon.com, may come with adverse effects as regards consumers’ inference.

Collaborating under Asymmetric Information
(joint with Sinem Hidir)
We analyze a model of dynamic collaboration in the presence of asymmetric information about a player’s ability. There is a team of two working to achieve a one time success on a project, and only the ability of one player is common knowledge (senior) while the ability of the other player (junior) is private information. This leads to gradual pessimism of the senior about the junior being of high ability as time passes without a success. The senior increases his effort over time in order to compensate for the junior’s (in expectation) lower ability. This is anticipated by the junior and therefore induces him to reduce his effort early on. We show that overall effort can increase when instead of adding a productive junior to the team with certainty, the junior’s ability is random and he is unproductive with positive probability. This uncertainty reduces the freeriding incentive of the senior.

Experimentation and Project Choice
(joint with Johannes Schneider)

Old Working Papers